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ABSTRACT
This study explores the problematic issues that caused
Chapter 11 and bankruptcy filings during the period of
March, 1989 to January, 1992. Unlike the approximately 85
airlines that went bankrupt during deregulation, 4 of the 6
airlines studied were original trunk carriers. The two
remaining were, at that time, the only two surviving
airlines born during deregulation. The data of these
carriers was tracked over a thirteen year period. The
tracking consisted of graphing financial / performance
variables over time and then the construction of a matrix
presenting the issues discovered in the literature search.
In tracking their problematic issues over time, common
factors present themselves as possible insights to their
corporate failure. The following seven factors were found
to have been common catalysts leading to insolvency:
1 - Effects of Deregulation
2 - Routes




7 - External Environment
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Chapter 1
Introduction
You have just finished four years of college and are
waiting for a taxi to take you to the airport, where you
will be flown to your first job interview. Your taxi is
late, so you call the company back and find that they have
not sent out a cab, but will dispatch one immediately. The
taxi arrives and you explain to the driver the importance of
making it to the airport on time. You arrive at the airport
and begin running for the ticket counter. As you get closer
you see that there are no lines, what a relief. You slow
down and focus your eyes you read the sign over the counter,
"Out of
Business."
Your airline has gone bankrupt. Knowing
the importance of your trip, you go to the next ticket
counter, only to find the same fate. Finally, you reach a
ticketing agent of an airline company who is still in
business. She is willing to sell you a ticket to New York
City from Buffalo for $400. You cannot
believe the price,
but you learn this is the only airline servicing this route.
This story is not that
unrealistic. Since 1991, six
airlines have filed for Chapter 11 protection, and three of







Trans World Airlines Inc. 1/31/92
America West Airlines 6/27/91
Midway Airlines 3/25/91 11/14/91
Pan Am Corp. 1/08/91 12/04/91
Continental Airlines Hldgs . 12/03/90
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 3/09/89 1/18/91
For many years these airlines were untouchable, only
small upstart airlines faced bankruptcy. Was it
deregulation that caused their demise? Was it the economy
that made these giants fall? Or are the strategies of these
carriers becoming out dated thus leading them into
insolvency?
The airline industry affects us all. Throughout the
course of this study, many of these questions will be
addressed. All the emphasis will be based on identifying
problematic issues that caused airlines to go bankrupt in
the 1990's.
Background
Before any study on the
airline industry can take
place, one must
first take a brief look at the issue of
deregulation. Airlines, like many other industries in the
United States, are privately owned. However, since these
airlines use federal airways and are involved in interstate
business, they are under the jurisdiction of the federal
government. The first federal regulation of airlines began
in 1925 with the Kelly Act. This act awarded contracts for
air mail transportation to private carriers.
Goverment regulation of the airline industry began with
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) . The CAB was formed from
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The responsibility of
the board was to oversee aviation matters affecting the
public. This involved supervision of routes, passengers,
and cargo fares. The CAB had the power to grant route
authorizations, establish uniform rules and fares, rule on
mergers and determine unfair competition.
With the expansion and growth of the industry,
government officials felt that it was time to lift the
controls on the airline industry. In 1978, the Airline
Deregulation Act was passed. This gave the airlines the
freedom of an open market system. Now airlines could
compete on the basis of price, service, and routing.
Deregulation brought about many positive changes. It
lowered rates and allowed more people the opportunity to
travel. Deregulation also brought service to new locations.
With competition, came more
services and increased quality.
However, not all of the events following deregulation have
3
been positive. During regulation, airlines were faced with
little competition. After deregulation, the industry was
now faced with competition and airline bankruptcy.
What allowed some airlines to survive post deregulation
and others to fail? More specifically, what caused the six
airlines that this study will focus on to fail? In
realizing the close proximity to their bankruptcy's
(approximately three years) , were there any common factors
in their failure? In facing bankruptcy in the airline
industry, many new issues are born. One of these new
issues, according to Robert Crandall was, "Airlines cannot
raise revenues sufficiently in a market place where
bankruptcy laws allow failed carriers, whose activities
grossly distort product pricing, to operate well past their
natural economic
lives."
(Poling, 1991) This issue was also
addressed in a July 1991 article titled, "Bankrupt lines
account for 20% of U.S.
traffic."
(Poling 1991) With the
loss of many airlines to bankruptcy, the travel industry
faced the possibility of a monopolized airline
industry. In
April 1991, America West Airlines, an airline operating
under Chapter 11, charged the "Big 3", Delta, American, and
United with having a monopoly of the domestic airline
industry. As one can see, bankruptcy is not only an airline
closing it's doors forever,
but it can have a much larger
effect on the travel industry as a whole.
Problem Statement
When an airline files for Chapter 11 and/or goes out of
business, it has a negative effect on the travel industry.
Effects on the traveling public include such issues as:
canceled tickets, delayed flights, and reduction in service
to many cities. Failing airlines also cause unequitable
competition among healthier airlines. Many airlines going
out of business perform last ditch efforts by cutting fares
so drastically that healthy airlines are forced to compete
on a level in which they lose money.
What has caused these six airlines to falter in such a
short period of time? By comparing each case, will this
study provide the formula leading to failure for others to
avoid? Determining what problematic issues existed that
caused insolvency is what needs to be addressed.
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to identify if there are
similar problematic issues that caused bankruptcy in the six
identified airline carriers. This research is of importance
due to the diminishing number of major carriers and the
alarming rate at which airlines
have filed for Chapter 11 or
have gone bankrupt. Since deregulation in 1979,
approximately 85 airlines have
gone bankrupt. (Dornheim,
1992)
By looking into the problematic issues surrounding the
downturn of these six airlines, the intent is to determine a
framework or pattern to their demise. In researching each
airline over time and describing the events and activities
that have caused internal problems, the study will attempt
to discover common issues to their failures.
This problem needs to be addressed in order to
determine if a particular course of action should be taken.
Many argue that the industry should be re-regulated or that
the way in which airlines use the Chapter 11 laws should be
changed. While deregulation was put into effect in order to
stimulate new airline growth and competition, we now see a
steadily shrinking industry.
The main purpose is to provide a qualitative holistic
view into problematic issues causing insolvency. Once common
issues are identified the purpose will be for others to
analysis the issues further, in order to apply them usefully
to their own specific needs.
Procedures
Two major techniques were utilized during the
collection of research for this study. These included the
tracking of performance data over a thirteen year period and
the creation of a matrix identifying the problems found in
the literature review.
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The performance variables chosen were: Available Seat
Miles, Passenger Revenue Miles, Passenger Load Factor, Break
Even Load Factor and Total Operating Income. These factors
were selected for their depiction of performance in the
airline industry. Available Seat Miles measures capacity
supplied by an airline. Revenue Passenger Miles measures
the output of an airline company's product. Load factor
presents a percentage of capacity, thus measuring
efficiency. Break even load factor demonstrates at what
level an airline should be selling it's product in order to
break even. Operating Income represents what the airlines
make from passenger transportation service only.- giving a
view of the profitability of the airline operation.
The objective of tracking these variables are to
compare each airline's performance to each other and
determine if any similarities exist. Also, by charting the
change in performance year by year, a search for any
cyclical patterns would be sought.
A literature search was conducted for each of the six
airlines from their inception or from 1979, whichever was
the latter. This review intended to find any possible
internal or external changes, actions or events that caused
change in each individual airline. The review revolved
around changes that caused negative outcomes. The events
7
and activities were recorded over time, in a matrix scheme,
in order to compare the findings of the literature.
Once the data from each method was collected and
recorded, the findings were compared. This was done in
order to compare events over time in each airline to their
performance variable giving an insight into the possible
relationship between these activities and performance.
The objective is to take a holistic looks into the
possible group of issues and or factors that caused each
airline to fall and file for Chapter 11 in such a short
period of time.
Hypothesis
The assumption of this study is that there are common
problematic issues that occurred amongst these six airlines
that led to either their bankruptcy or Chapter 11 filing.
Definition of Terms
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
- Law amending the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958; it provided for a phased
ending to the CAB's regulatory authority
over domestic
airlines by December 31, 1984.
Airline Reporting Corporation (KRC, - the U.S.
organization responsible for appointing travel agents to
sell domestic tickets.
Available Seat Mile (ASM,' - measures the capacity
supplied by an airline, in terms of one seat transported one
mile.
Bankruptcy - a company who has done any of the acts
that by law entitle the creditors of the corporation to take
any and all assets.
Chapter 11 - referred to filing a petition in federal
court under Title 11 of the U.S. code, asking for the
protection of the bankruptcy laws. Chapter 11 is for
business reorganizations done by corporations. Chapter 11 's
primary function is formulation of a pay out plan as an
alternative to liquidation of assets to pay debtors.
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) - the former United
States government regulatory body designated under the
Federal Aviation Act to consider aviation matters affecting
the public convenience and necessity, including supervision
of routes, passenger and cargo fares. Much of the CAB's
role and authority was diminished under deregulation.
Deregulation - the act of deregulating the travel
industry. This included phasing out the CAB by January 1,
1985, removing travel agency exclusivity, thus paving the
way for carriers to
appoint and pay commission to non travel
agents, and removal of
anti-trust immunity for travel
agents .
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Load Factor - The percentage of capacity, measured in
seat miles sold by an airline.
Travel Agency - an establishment accredited by the
Airline Reporting Corporation, international airlines travel
agent network, and other conferences, which gives
information, arranges reservations, and sell tickets to
travelers .
Travel Agent - person, firm, or corporation qualified
to sell tours, cruises, transportation, hotel
accommodations, meals, transfers, sightseeing, and all the
other elements of travel.
Revenue Passenger Enplanements - the total number of
revenue passenger boarding aircraft in scheduled service,
including origination, stopover or connecting passengers.
Revenue Passenger Mile (RPM)
-
measures the output of






This study focuses on determining if any common
problems occurred in the Chapter 11 and/or bankruptcy
filings that took place in the airline industry from
February, 1991 to February, 1992. In order to determine if
any common problematic issues developed among the six
airlines studied in this period, a historical analysis of
their operations was undertaken from 1978 to 1992. This
chapter will look at the articles and relevant literature in






Trans World Airlines Inc.
The year 1978 was chosen as a starting point of the
literature search, but not as a limit or restraint, because
it represents a point just prior to deregulation. This will
give an overview of the airline's operation prior to
deregulation, during the deregulation process, and under the
present free market system. In the review of the
literature, only information pretaining
to problematic
11
issues that may have lead to reasons for the individual
company failure will be addressed.
The following sections of this chapter will be divided
into six sections, each section addressing a different
airline. These sections will include the following: a brief
history of the airline's founding, description of leadership
and management, discussion of services, review of finance
and cost issues, and will conclude on the topic of events
surrounding their Chapter 11 and/or bankruptcy filing date.
These areas were covered in each to present an overview of
the carrier as it existed during the mid 1970 's to it's
insolvency.
America West Airlines
America West began it's planning and development
in 1981 and provided it's first revenue service in August,
1983. Like many other carriers of the period, it was born
out of the deregulation era
-
a low cost, regional airline
ready to carve it's niche among the giants of the industry.
America West began its operations with three Boeing 727-200
aircraft, serving five cities. In just five short months,
America West was flying to 12 cities and operating a fleet
of 10 aircraft.
This start-up airline was formed around the principle
of developing a hub-and-spoke system with Phoenix Sky Harbor
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Airport as their nucleus. This airport was selected for its
central location, year-round good weather, and proximity to
California. The airline founders also felt developing a
site in Phoenix was an important decision, because its
uncongested airport provided an excellent opportunity in
maintaining a high standard of on-time performance and
connecting flights reliability.
Employee involvement played a strong role in the
foundation of America West Airlines. Once hired, each
America West employee was required to purchase company stock
equivalent to 2 0% of their first year's gross salary. "The
transaction which could be financed by America West over a
five year period through a payroll deduction was designed
to promote employee productivity and corporate
identity."
(Randolph, 1983)
Cross-training was another area in which America West
employees played a strong role in its design. All America
West employees, except flight crew members, were rotated
through several jobs. This created not only employee
comprehension of most operating procedures, but helped
create greater job satisfaction and productivity. This was
achieved by giving employees the opportunity to experience
different jobs, avoiding boredom in the work force.
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The airline was founded by Edward R. Beauvais and
Michael J. Conway in 1981. Michael J. Conway currently acts
as both CEO and President, while company founder Edward
Beauvais resigned his position as Chairman of the Board on
July 31, 1992. (Dornheim, 1992) "Both Conway and Beauvais
have financial backgrounds, but Beauvais is considered to be
the long-range planner, while Conway is more involved with
operations."
(Dornheim, 1992)
Prior to establishing America West, Michael Conway
served as Vice President and Controller at Continental
Airlines. (10-K Report, 1992)
America West's route expansion began with three Boeing
737-200 and five cities. By 1991, they had added
ninety-seven aircraft and were now serving over sixty
destinations. The company began as a short-to-medium-range
carrier serving destinations ranging 1000 miles from
Phoenix. During 1987, America West began their long-haul
service flying Boeing 757 's, and by the early
1990'
s they
were serving destinations as far away as Hawaii and Japan.
The company's initial markets were located in the
Southwest. These included many cities along southern
California, such as Los Angeles and San Diego. Many
Midwestern destinations were also served, including cities
in Kansas and New Mexico. By the end of 1991, America West
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had penetrated the northern markets of Boston, Newark and
Washington, D.C. Through this market expansion, America
West dominated its two major hubs: Phoenix and Las Vegas,
with 46% and 41% market shares respectively, in 1991.
America West passenger mix has always revolved around a
50/50 business to pleasure market mix.
With its attempt to open a hub in Columbus, Ohio the
airline's strategy centered on gaining a more profitable
consumer. The company has always served its markets through
a multi-hub system. This includes the development of a hub
in: Phoenix - 1983, Las Vegas - 1987, and Columbus - 1991.
Two key factors have kept America West's cost down are
their workforce and aircraft. Throughout most of America
West's history it has followed its founding philosophy of
using a standard fleet of Boeing 737-type aircraft. These
aircraft have only two engines and require just two pilots,
reducing overhead dramatically- Due to the standardization
of the fleet, these airplanes also reduce parts and
maintenance expenses. America West also benefits from the
age of their aircraft. They presently have an average age
of 6 years, about half the current industry numbers.
By looking at the events and actions of America West,
three areas point to probable cause in their Chapter 11
15
filing. These include: company growth, hub development,
and the external effects of the economy due to the Persian
Gulf Crisis.
One of the major reasons attributed to the lack of
profits at America West has been the startling rate at which
the carrier has grown. (Loeffelholz 1989) While having a
non-labor work force is a plus, it's size has grown from 280
employees to over 12,000 employees in only ten years.
(Vellocci, 1988) Along with employee growth came rapid
route and fleet expansion. Their fleet size grew from ten
aircraft in 1983 to one-hundred-four in 1992. The negative
effect of this growth became apparent when in 1987, losses
totaled $46 million. It is shown in Figure 1 that Available
Seat Miles doubled from 1986 to 1987. America West's market
niche has also outgrown its original intent. In the
beginning, America West's markets were focused around short
to medium-haul destinations surrounding its hub in Phoenix.
From 1986 to 1990, the number of cities serviced doubled
from approximately thirty to sixty. By the time they filed
for bankruptcy in 1991, they had expanded their markets from
New York to Hawaii and Japan. Now, in times of financial
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The last two issues together played the greatest role
in America West's problems. These are hub development and
the effects of the Persian Gulf War. With its debts
totaling $624 million in 1990 at the beginning of the Gulf
War, the airline was unable to handle the unforeseen change
in fuel costs. Fuel costs for America West were on average
$0.61.6 per gallon in 1989. In July 1990, just prior to the
Persian Gulf Crisis, fuel costs were as low as $0.58.6 per
gallon. During the next three quarters of the Gulf War,
fuel costs rose first to $0.71.3, then to $0.75.7, and
finally all the way up to $1.07 per gallon. Unfortunately
during this period, America West was attempting to open a
third hub in Columbus, Ohio. Due to a combination of these
two events, America West reported a net loss of $222 million
in 1991, and Figure 2 shows an operating loss of $104
million. These two losses exceeded totals of all losses in
the past in these categories.
America West may have fared better if they followed the
expansion plan of their closest competitor, Southwest
Airlines. It took Southwest Airlines an additional ten
years to achieve the size of America West.
Midway Airlines
Midway Airlines
submitted its CAB application in
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competition in the airline industry, and with growing
notions of deregulation, the CAB granted an operating
license. With it's inaugural flight on November 1, 1979.
Midway was considered to be the first offspring of
deregulation. Their flight operations started at the old
Midway Airport in Chicago, using three, leased DC-9
aircraft. Initial service included flights connecting
Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Kansas City. The airline's
choice of Midway Airport as its hub evolved from their
belief that being closer to Chicago's Loop would attract
those passengers flying to and from Chicago, not requiring
connecting flights. (Business Week, 11/12/79)
The airline was founded by Irving T. Tague, who left
Hughes Airwest in 1976 to found his Midway idea. In 1970,
Hughes had hired Tague away from the airline consulting firm
of Simat, Helliesen and Eichner, Inc. He then became
General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of Airwest.
Within thirteen months he had made Airwest profitable after
it's loss of $20 million the year before. (Gross, 1981)
"Tague started literally at the bottom of the business
at the age of 19. His first job was emptying Pan American
toilets at the Fairbanks, Alaska Airport. After a steady
rise to the top in the pedestrian planning
and scheduling
divisions of Pan Am and Northeastern, plus success at
20
Airwest,"
he became the founder of Midway Airlines. (Gross,
1981)
Midway's service began with the Cleveland and Detroit
areas and then expanded into Washington, D.C., St. Louis,
and New York. This initial service was considered
"no-frills"
and tended to attract the leisure market
concentrated in the Northeast. After losing money in its
first two years and making gains in the next two years 1981
and 198 2 (see Figure 3) , Midway decided it needed to change
its service strategy. After price wars in 1982, Midway's
management decided that competing as a carrier devoted
primarily to tourist traffic was the wrong course, and it's
future lay in competing for the frequent business traveler
(Troxell, Jr., 1983) This shift was called Metrolink
Service, which in its first phase consisted of a
business-
class DC-9 linking New York's La Guardia Airport with
Chicago's Midway Airport. This was the beginning of an
attempt to completely changing Midway's image from one of
no-frills to one aimed at attracting the frequent business
traveler requiring all the amenities.
This new service was
launched by Arthur C. Bass, CEO, who was recruited by the
airline to replace the former President of Midway, Gordon
Linkon. (Byrne, 1983)
With this transition came growing pains. Mr. Bass








Speculation eluded to differences with the Board of
Directors for the losses associated in 1983 and 1984, during
the transition from a no-frills carrier to the Metrolink
Services. (Byrne, 1985)
David R. Hinson, Director of the Board, took
Bass'
place in 1985. Mr. Hinson graduated with a Business Degree
from the University of Washington. He then went to join the
Navy and became a fighter pilot. After the Navy he went on
to fly planes for Northwest and United. In 1963, he landed
a job as Director of flight training at West Coast Airlines,
where he met Irving T. Tague, the founder of Midway.
After taking over Midway, Mr. Hinson began to revert
back to Midway's original style with the offering of a new
discount fare to help boost load factors, called the
Metromiser. Looking at Figure 4, passenger loads jumped
above break even loads from 1984 to 1987 with consistent
high levels, until their bankruptcy in 1991. He also began
to redesign planes so they no longer were completely all
business-class .
During this period of service and leadership
transition, Midway purchased the assets of defunct Air
Florida Inc. in July 1985. This changed Midway's
standardized fleet by adding Boeing 737 's to its fleet of













tookover Air Florida's routes in the Virgin Islands and
Florida.
Midway's initial cost advantages were; it's low
operating cost at Midway Airport and it's purchase of used
DC-9 aircraft at one-third the cost than if new. Using this
cost strategy, Midway was able to survive the 1980 's, but by
the end of 1989 their overall financial performance was
changing in the midst of a rapid expansion. Midway placed
and order for 37 MD-80 jets at $900 million and bid for
Eastern's hub at Philadelphia for $200 million. Also during
this year, Midway introduced its coast to coast service.
With the approval of the Philadelphia Purchase from Eastern,
service to this second hub began in November 1989.
In focusing on the performance and activities of Midway
Airlines, several issues point to its bankruptcy. The three
that surface the most often are corporate strategy and
leadership, company growth, and the effect of the Persian
Gulf Crisis.
Midway's corporate strategy changed about as often as
its leadership did. Midway's original founder, Irving, T.
Tague, Chairman of the Board, and Gordon Linkon, President,
founded the company on simple principles. Their principles
were low prices, and simplified service with a single type
of aircraft (DC-9) flying out of the Midway Airport hub.
25
Tague felt he would provide the Freddie Laker approach to a
regional airline. This approach revovled around the that
air travelers wanted to fly as cheaply as possible, and
would go out of their way to do so. (Gross, 1981) Midway
remained a no-frills economy priced airline for the first
three years of its foundation, until the year 1983.
In 1983, Arthur C. Bass, the former President of
Federal Express Corp., began to switch the company's
strategy from the low-fare strategy to one seeking the
frequent business flier. Mr. Bass had been recruited in
1982 to help keep Midway aloft. Mr. Bass introduced an all
business-class service called Metrolink, similar to
Eastern's shuttle, but with all the amenities. Many changes
were needed to revamp Midway's no-frills image. This became
a very expensive transformation for Midway. Jets had to be
reconfigured, and services added.
While this service seemed to work at first, its
performance in 1983 and 1984 left Midway with widespread
losses. Midway's operating losses jumped to $11 million in
1983 and then to $12 million in 1984, producing Midway's
first major losses since its inception. (See Figure 3, p.
22) These losses led to the resignation of Mr. Bass in
early 1985.
26
In order to help Midway get back on its feet again, the
Board of Directors placed another man at the helm of
Midway's falling ship. This was David R. Hinson, a fellow
member of the Board of Directors since 1979. Mr. Hinson
'
s
first act was to scrap
Bass'
attempt at making Midway a
total business-class airline. Mr. Hinson began by launching
the Metromiser discounted fare in order to boost traffic.
He also took the assets of Air Florida and converted them to
a discounted service, while maintaining Midway's Metrolink
aircraft for serving the business market. This market mix
served Midway well as it posted continuous operating income
growth over the next five years. Even after making small
profits, Midway's leader Hinson eliminated all
business-class sections and converted them to low-priced
seats.
Through 1985, Midway's growth was steady and
controlled. But in the long run, Midway Airport would not
be able to withstand much growth at any level. Midway
didn't offer the array of connecting flights, surrounding
convention hotels and mass transportation that O'Hare had.
"In addition, Midway's runways were too





By late in 1986, Midway's
expansion began with it's
first purchase of eight new planes, with an option to
27
purchase twenty-eight more. After a five-year period of
success, CEO Hinson began his push for growth. He placed an
order for $900 million in aircraft and spent another $200
million in the purchase of a hub in Philadelphia. Starting
that year, Midway's operations produced record losses which
continued until it's bankruptcy in 1991.
Unfortunately, Mr. Hinson 's timing for expansion could
not have predicted the effects that the Persian Gulf Crisis
would have on his large capital commitments. Midway's
operations lost $84 million in 1990. Midway was also forced
to sell their second hub in Philadelphia to USAir. Figure 5
shows revenue passenger miles had peaked in 1990, but with
the Gulf Crisis and loss of their second hub, Midway's RPM's
dropped dramatically the next year. This caused over
capacity in Midway's supply of available seat miles.
Pan Am
It goes without saying that prior to Pan Am's
financial difficulties in the early 1970 's, Pam Am had been
the premier airline. Pan Am was founded by Juan Trippe in
1927. Trippe was able to move unchecked throughout the
world, serving almost every
foreign market with little
competition.
Throughout the 1950 's and 1960 's, Pan Am was the
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Since Pan Am had such a hold on international markets,
U.S. airline companies just simply fed their domestic
traffic into Pan Am's. Pan Am was also recognized for
moving theairline industry into the 'jet age' with its
commitment to the Boeing 747.
Extravagance and grandeur were one of the unfortunate
problems left behind by founder, Juan Trippe. In 1966 he
set off a global capital-investment binge by placing an
order for twenty-five Boeing 747 's at a cost of $600
million. (O'Hanlon, 1974) Trippe 's permanent tribute to his
legacy was the building of the Worldport Terminal at Kennedy
Airport. It had cost $126 million ($76 million over
budget) , considerably more than it cost to build the
fifty-seven story Pan Am Building in Midtown Manhattan.
(O'Hanlon, 1974)
Mr. Trippe did not prepare the leadership to follow him
either. Harold Grey, who succeeded Trippe as CEO in 1968,
purchased eight additional 747 's within months of beginning
his reign. Grey retired in 1970, due to illness, and was
replaced by Najeeb Halaby, who had been recruited by Trippe.
(O'Hanlon, 1974) Halaby knew little
about the business,
other than what he had picked up as head of the Federal
Aviation Authority. Much of his time was spent lobbying in
Washington for a domestic franchise or sounding out other
carriers on the prospects of a merger. (O'Hanlon, 1974)
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Najeeb Halaby left in 1972. His replacement was William
Seawell.
Pan Am's performance began to suffer in the 1970* s with
the poor transition from Juan Trippe. From the end of
Trippe 's term as CEO in 1968, Pan Am had not posted a profit
until 1977. This did not in any way provide the support or
the preparation Pan Am needed to survive the deregulation
era.
William Seawell, formerly Vice President of American
Airlines, was the Pan Am leader charged with leading the
airline into the era of deregulation. Seawell was very
handicapped from the beginning. Heading into deregulation,
Pan Am faced three major hurdles. The first one was the
lack of an established domestic route system. The next was
the age and type of their aircraft. The last factor was a
reliance on an international route system developed in an
era of very little competition and high demand.
While Pan Am provided full-service air travel, they
were unable to obtain domestic route service needed to
remain competitive. With more competition from domestic
U.S. carriers on Pan Am's international routes, they needed
a new feeder source from the U.S. for their foreign routes.
In the past, Pan Am was able to
sit back and be fed by other
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domestic carriers, like American and United, who lacked
international routes.
Seawell 's two strategies for Pan Am's market were to
discontinue service to remote destinations and conform the
remainder of the routes around the advantages of his jet
airplanes. At the time, Pan Am was flying to remote
destinations, such as Belem, located in the jungle of
Brazil, and Kelfavik, Iceland. He also continued his battle
to gain ground in domestic markets. Pan Am had to redraw
it's route map around the capabilities of the Boeing 747,
due to their overabundance from the Trippe era.
In order for Seawell to break into the U.S. domestic
markets, Pan Am attempted to create a hub in Houston and
purchase National Airlines. National Airlines would be the
break. The merger occurred in 1979 at a price of $400
million, with the deal actually closing in January 1980.
This merger that seemed to be the savior Pan Am had been
searching for turned out to be just the problem they didn't
need as the industry headed for deregulation.
The first problem associated with the merger was its
purchase price and timing. After a long bidding war with
Texas International Airlines Inc. (TIA) , Seawell paid $50
per share almost double book value for the stock. If it
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hadn't been bad enough that Pan Am paid too much, the
purchase occurred when the domestic routes were becoming
free-for-the-taking under deregulation. As the merger
began, the economy was producing sagging traffic due to the
existing recession and fuel costs were soaring. As one Pan
Am director stated, "If you could pick and choose your
timing to go through the trauma and enormous extra expense
of a merger you probably wouldn't want to do it just as the
economy was heading into a recession and the prime lending
rate was heading to
20%." (Staff Reporter, 1981) Two key
factors that made the merger a disaster for Pan Am were
their route structure and the poor integration of management
and staff.
As the two airlines merged, National's CEO for the last
17 years, L.B. Maytag, declined to join the management team
of the newly merged National. (Carley, 1980, Jan. 10) A
little more than six months into the merger, Pan Am let go
approximately 200 managers and nearly
2,800 hourly workers.
(Carley, 1980, Jan. 10) This decision was based on cutting
costs during a time of declining traffic. Since many people
were let go through an early retirement program, the senior
employees earning higher wages,
left less experienced
employees to run Pan Am. This caused serious service
problems for Pan Am, unable to provide the same quality of
service with less experienced employees.
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The service problems were seen most in the area of
reservations. Since most National reservationists were used
to booking simple flight itineraries from Miami to new York,
they were not accustomed to arranging trips to Abidjan and
Hong Kong with connections in Pago Pago. Telephone calls
for reservations began to take 15-20 minutes per call. At
one point Pan Am was not answering one-third of the
telephone calls made to its central reservations number.
Based out of Florida, serving the East Coast and routes
extending out to the West Coast, the National merger could
not feed enough traffic into Pan Am's international routes.
Where destinations did merge, the flights were scheduled too
closely together, causing delays in upwards of 4 0% of Pan
Am's international flights. (Carley, 1981)
One of Pan Am's legacies was its commitment to the 'jet
age', specifically to the Boeing 747. With this claim of
being the "first on the block", Pan Am ran into problems as
these new jets evolved into one of the oldest fleets in the
industry. This caused a two-fold problem. The problem was
not only the large capital
required to purchase these
aircraft, but the cash
demand it required to attempt
replacement.
In order for Pan Am to survive the heavy cash demand
needed to run its aging fleet and to provide new aircraft
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along the way, was through the sale of profitable assets and










19 8 0 Sale of headquarters building $400.0 $16.7 $80.3
19 8 1 Sale of hotel subsidiary 375
Deferral of pension funding 48.1
Labor concessions 36.5
Sale of tax benefits 82.2
Sale and leaseback of 8 aircraft 200
TOTAL 741.8 28.4 -18.9
19 8 2 Sale of hotel subsidiary 125
Deferral of pension funding 133
Labor concessions 146
Deferral of lease payments 18.8
Sale of tax benefits 50.2
Mortgages on 2 aircraft 30
Sale of 1 cargo plane 41
TOTAL 544 47.2 -85.3
19 8 3 Deferral of pension funding 63.5
Labor concessions 115
Deferral of debt payments 82
Deferral of lease payments 14.9
Sale of 1 cargo plane 42
Two public debt offerings 250
TOTAL 567.4 365.7 -51
19 8 6 Sale of Pacific Division to UAL 750
Source: Popper, A. (1984, June 4). A recovered Pan Am
faces tomorrow's hurdles. Business Week. 60-68.
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Through the sale of many of Pan Am's assets it was a
very different airline by 1987. Employees unhappy with how
the loss of these assets had changed Pan Am forced CEO
Edward Ackler to leave as a condition of their wage
concessions. From that point on, Pan Am searched for a
company that they might be able to merge with in order to
save what was left of the airline.
Pan Am's strong international route system was
initially viewed as a positive factor, but as competition
increased and world events evolved, this international based
route system began to show signs of wear.
By the mid 1970 's, Pan Am began to face an inordinate
number of competitors in their foreign markets. Pan Am was
faced with thirteen scheduled airlines across the Pacific,
twenty-three in Central and South American and twenty-nine
across the Atlantic. Many of these airlines were given less
restricted flights into the U.S. while Pan Am faced foreign
regulations. These competitors also benefited from being
highly subsidized as the 'flag
carrier' for their respective
government .
Pan Am had been flying to over 70 cities and 38
countries on 6 continents in the early days of deregulation.
Because these routes traveled to the farthest corners of the
globe, something
was always affecting it; strikes, civil
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wars, terrorism, natural disasters. This problem was most
prevalent in 1981 while Pan Am's international route
structure was still large; they were losing $1 million per
day. (Kraar, 1981)
These effects of Pan Am's vast foreign markets and the
onset of anti-American feelings resulted in the Pan Am
Flight 103 bombing in December, 1988 over Lockerbee,
Scotland.
With the lack of success in making a hub out of their
Houston facilities, the terminal at JFK became their
workable alternative. This hub began development in 1982 in
order to feed its worldwide foreign destinations.
Trans World Airlines
TWA was one of the first three major airlines to
serve the United States when air transportation began in the
1910 's and 1920 's. These three airlines were United,
handling routes along the northern tier, TWA through the
middle, and American in the south.
In the late 1960 's when Howard Hughes, TWA's infamous
leader, was still a principle
owner of Trans World Airlines
Inc., TWA began a strategy
towards diversification. The
company's objective then and into the early 1980 's, was to
build non-airline businesses that
would smooth the wild,
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cyclical fluctuations common in the airline industry. (Staff
Reporter, 1980, May 19) In the year 1967, TWA purchased
$86 million of stock to buy Hilton's international hotel
chain, Hilton International Co., and in 1973 they bought
Canteen Corp.
, the largest purveyor of vending machines in
the U.S. (Staff Reporter, 1980, May 19) By 1979 the
strategy had reached full speed. TWA purchased Spartan Food
System Inc.
, a fast food chain, for $82 million in cash, and
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. for $92 million.
Unfortunately, this scheme didn't help smooth losses or
compliment the airline service as well as hoped. In 1970,
the company lost $93.2 million, and in 1975 another $91.9
million. By the first quarter of the deregulation era in
1980, non air profits only offset part of TWA's $59 million
loss, leaving TW, the parent company, with a loss of $49.3
million. (Staff Reporter, 1980, May 19)
In reviewing TWA from just prior to deregulation to the
present, several issues point to their need for filing for
Chapter 11 on January 31, 1992. These included labor costs,
age of fleet, domestic route system, and the hostile
takeover by Carl Icahn.
TWA's management's inability to lower labor costs
played a major role in its financial problems until Carl
Icahn was able to gain concessions. In
1982 for example,
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under competition from many nonunion airlines, TWA attempted
to win wage concessions and work rules. This only resulted
in a strike by the TWA machinists around midnight on
December 26, 1992. "The strike was over in five minutes.
Mr. Meyer [Pan Am CEO at the time], facing potentially
devastating losses from a strike ordered his negotiators to
give union leaders what they wanted: 3 0% pay raise over
three years. With this deal, he wasn't even able to gain
any efficiency work-rule
changes."
(Carley, 1984, Jan. 10)
Mr. Meyer made small progress in 1984 when the pilots union
accepted a 10% wage cut and nonunion workers were imposed
another 10% in reductions. This saved a total of $106
million. Still Meyer knew that TWA needed a union-wide wage
reduction purchase. Nothing would come close to this until
the union had to pick between Frank Lorenzo and Carl Icahn.
They backed Icahn 's takeover with wage concessions to avoid
Lorenzo's union bashing style.
TWA inherited two problems coming into today's
deregulated markets. The first was its reliance on an
international route system, and the second the old age of
it's fleet. It's international route system required a
strong domestic
market. This strong strong domestic feeder
system was something TWA never
had. Like its other
international competitor Pan Am, TWA had required little
need for a domestic route system. Since
prior to
deregulation carriers like American and United provided the
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supply of passengers. To enhance it's domestic needs TWA
developed a hub in 1980 in St. Louis. Even while TWA gained
87% of the market share in 1987 with the merger of Ozark
Airlines, they still lacked the benefit of hubs located in
larger market cities, such as Chicago and Dallas. While TWA
may have made St. Louis a quality facility, it wasn't a
strogn enough location. Also, the airport itself had
problems early on.
The first problem was that the runways were too close
together, thus lacking maximum capacity early on. The
second problem was that only one runway could handle
instrument landings. The feeling that the hub was in the
wrong location is stated below by an airline executive.
Looking at Chicago it has always been a major connecting
center for airline traffic; it also has a large local
market. O'Hare, the nation's busiest airport, tends to draw
connections northward, while Dallas pulls from the South.
American has 271 daily, nonstop departures at Dallas/Ft.
Worth to 75 destinations, while United at Chicago has 274 to
74 cities. TWA dominated operations at St. Louis, but it
has only 178 daily flights from there to 50 destinations.
"Neither the local population nor the airport at St. Louis
is big enough to support enough frequency to compete against




TWA was in a constant battle to replace its aging
aircraft ever since it entered the competitive era of
deregulation. Even ten years after deregulation, it still
had one of the highest average aircraft ages. (See Table 2)
TWA's last major event before its Chapter 11 filing was
its Carl Icahn era. In 1985, Carl Icahn had been attending
the annual junk-bond conference hosted by Drexel Burnham.
During this conference he heard a presentation by Robert
Perser, Chief Financial Officer of Trans World Airlines.
(Steven, 1993) Carl, intrigued by the immense cash flow
potential in airlines, set his mind on the possibility of
buying TWA.
As he began to purchase stock in TWA and continue to
gain a majority interest, Frank Lorenzo began to do the
same. After a fierce battle with Lorenzo, Icahn won. Carl
had paid Lorenzo over $50 million in compensation for his
interest in TWA and won the Board of Directors approval of
the sale by enticing the unions to back him. At first the
unions didn't support Ichan, so they began to look into
several 'white
knights'- someone to come to their rescue.
One such man was Frank Borman at Eastern. Frank Lorenzo's
arrival on the scene had changed everything. As one author
put it, "to them [labor unions] Frank Lorenzo was the devil
incarnate."
(Stevens, 1993) Ever since he had angered the
unions by taking Continental
Airlines into voluntary
bankruptcy in 1983, he had
been despised by organized labor.
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As he prepared to take over TWA, the unions were determined
to play the role of spoiler.
Carl Icahn 's hostile takeover was able to foster wage
concessions, merge Ozark Airlines and begin to bring
financial performance back into the black. Unfortunately
for Icahn and TWA, he had made his first major mistake with
this particular takeover. He violated his own principal by
getting emotionally involved with the idea of running an
airline. "He became engrossed in the idea of commanding a
global airline with an arsenal of jets and a small army of
war trained pilots." (Stevens, 1993) Icahn also expected
that if he turned TWA around, he would command the
respectability of a true entrepreneur like Andrew Carnegie,
Bill Paley, Tom Watson, and Ross Perot who had built
enormous businesses and had become deeply ingrained in the
American folklore. (Stevens, 199 3)
While Carl Icahn believed he had engineered a dramatic
turnaround by 1987 with operating income around $240
million. A deeper look proved otherwise. A good part of the
profits revealed that many were based more on the financial
engineering than his
managerial abilities. (Stevens, 1993)
This is stated below in excerpt from the biography on Ichan:
"Consider the use of more liberal depreciation methods that
enabled TWA to extend the useful life
projections on the
carrier's wide-body aircraft, producing
savings of $44
42
million. And note that TWA gained roughly $50 million from
a long standing lawsuit against Hughes Tool Co. Subtract
these and other extraordinary sums, including tax loss
carried forward, and TWA's result would have shown losses."
(Stevens, 1993)
From this period in 1988 to the present Chapter 11
filing in January 1992, TWA's energies were focused on Icahn
vs. TWA. Using TWA's funds, Carl purchased TWA and
privatized it. The unions began to see that Carl was not
going to invest his own funds or even TWA's funds into
revising the airline. Union feelings for Icahn were
expressed in two jokes that swept TWA's front lines: "Carl
and one of his aides are walking down the street when a
young blonde passes by. The aide says to Carl, 'Hey, why
don't you screw
her?'
Carl replies, 'Out of
what?"1
Saddam Hussein looks in the mirror and asks, 'Mirror,
mirror, who's the meanest, most detestable son of a bitch in
the world?' 'What! Who the hell is Carl
Icahn?'"
(Stevens,
1993) The nature of these corporate jokes give one the sense
of how serious the negative feelings towards Ichan had
grown .
It is during this time in which the airlines were
battling a recession and the
negative effects of the Gulf
Crisis, that instead of focusing
on operational matters,
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Carl focused on ridding himself of his burden, TWA. And TWA
focused on getting rid of its burden, Carl Icahn.
Eastern Airlines
Eastern Airlines was one of the four original
trunk carriers (United, American, and TWA) to serve the
United States. During it's early years it was led by WWI
flying ace, Captain Eddie Rickenbacker . Captain
Rickenbacker served Eastern Airlines from the 1930 's through
the early 1960 's.
It is during these early years, that the seeds for
Eastern's future demise were planted. While United,
American, and TWA were truly national in air service,
Eastern, as it's name implies, was a regional carrier.
(Bernstein, 1990) Rickenbacker
'
s early strategy was flying
routes along the Eastern seaboard, especially from Florida
to populated cities in the Northeast. The airline prospered
in the early days as the tourist business in Florida grew,
but as time would prove, this became one if it's problems in
the post-deregulated market.
As the jet age began, it was said that Eddie hated to
buy new planes. It was this
decision to stick with the old
propeller-driven planes that would be the catalyst for many
problems to come.
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From the early 1960's through 1975, Rickenbacker s five
successors played catch-up and bought jets as fast as they
could. By that year in 197 5, when Frank Borman became
President of Eastern, they had $1 billion in debt. Just
before deregulation, Borman ordered $1.4 billion worth of
the Airbus A-300's and the efficient Boeing 757 's.
Three issues arise in viewing the events and features
surrounding Eastern's bankruptcy- These were the effects of
deregulation on Eastern's route strategy, its purchasing of
excess aircraft and labor-management relations.
With the onset of deregulation, Eastern's routes got a
lift from the 'budget-conscious' leisure market travelers
flying to its southern destinations. But with the
introduction of new competition, like People's Express,
Eastern began to lose market share. In the first couple of
years of deregulation, they lost 5% of their New
York-Washington, D.C. market share. "Soon Rickenbacker
'
s
Florida routes looked like the dumbest idea in the world:
Eastern's flights catered to vacationers and retirees who
could put off their trip if they didn't like the
price."
(Bernstein, 1990)
Frank Borman needed to find a potential partner for his
north-south routes in order to gain West Coast route
strength. This turned out to be an offer of more than $425
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million for National Airlines. This merger never occurred,
partly because the CAB regulators felt this would give
Eastern unfair advantage in the East Coast to Florida route,
where National had also been strong. Also, Eastern's debt
burden would not have made it a wise financial solution.
Borman began talks with Braniff's Chairman, John S. Casey,
in 1981, in another attempt to gain a stronger national
route system. The talks collapsed when Borman and Casey
agreed that merging two airlines during a recession would be
too disruptive. Also, they could never agree on how they
would properly merge both work forces. About a
year-and-a-half later, Eastern won the rights to purchase
Braniff's internationals routes to South America for $3 0
million, but still lacked the strong nationwide route
structure that its original trunk partners had.
While Borman tried to strengthen the route
structure, he also led Eastern on a $3 billion fleet
modernization program. In order for Borman to fund this
program, he not only had to win bank approvals, but also
gain concessions from the unions. It was this overzealous
speed at which Frank Borman purchased aircraft that led to
continuous problems with the unions. In over a decade as
Eastern's leader, Borman purchased 142 new airplanes. This
resulted in Eastern's costs far outweighing revenues. (See
Figure 6) "In 1977, Eastern's long term debt shot up by 50%,
by 122% in 1979, 200% in 1981,










(Bernstein, 1990) The following chronology best
demonstrates the events that began the war between Eastern's
leaders and unions and ended Eastern's 62 year history:
1979 Amid $100 million in wage losses, the
International Association of Machinists'
(IAM) District 100 hires 'militant
President', Charles Bryan.
1981 IAM District 100 creates a corporate research





1982 unions continue to work without contracts.
1983 machinists reject management's final offer
and brace for strike.
March Borman gives into unions with 17% wage
increase over 3 years, retroactive January 1.
September Eastern's income well below projections.
Borman declares in videotaped speech that the
airline has three choices: to go out of
business, "a la Braniff", to file for
protection, "a la Continental", or to reduce
labor costs drastically.
December Upon review of Eastern's finances, unions
acknowledge Eastern's condition and accept
wage concessions totaling $300 million. The
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agreement includes return to old wages in
January, 1985.
1984 Eastern turns profit mid-year management
says that they cannot afford a wage
restoration and make a profit.
1985 Eastern is technically in default of loans,
Borman unilaterally extends the one-year wage
cut into 1985.
February Eastern in good faith pays employees
rescinded wage cut from January.
Eastern and IAM reach agreement that includes
restoration of 5% of the 18% cut from wages.
April Eastern reaches three-year contract agreement
with machinists.
1986 Even after making its first small profit
since 1979, Borman believes they are on the
verge of destruction and begins to pressure
unions for more deep pay cuts. Unions
indicate they would consider some
concessions, but not without change in top
management.
February The pilots union
reaches a tentative
agreement with the firm following a
threatened sale of the airline to Texas Air









Company approves Texas Air acquisition bid,
in spite of previous agreements.
Frank Borman resigns as CEO and agrees to
become vice-chairman and a director of TAC.
Joseph Leonard becomes acting CEO.
Texas Air's acquisition of Eastern is
approved by DOT.
Frank Lorenzo is named chairman. Phillip
Bakes becomes president, CEO, and a director.
Eastern's employee unions file suit in U.S.
district court to block Texas Air's pending
acquisition of Eastern for $600 million in
cash and notes. The suit alleges that
Eastern's board of directors disregard
employees' interests and also claims that
Texas Air swayed the board to accept the bid.
Shareholders approve takeover at a special
meeting which ended early because union
members shouted down management.
Eastern files suit against the company's
machinist union seeking to enjoin it from
unlawful proxy
solicitation.'
TAC folds its New York Air and People Express
units into its Continental Airlines unit.
This move consolidated TAC's operations into








TAC unveils a business plan that calls for
sharp wage cuts.
Texas Air shifts six jumbo jets from Eastern
Airlines to Continental revealing a
willingness to move assets from its unionized
subsidiary to its nonunion airlines.
A new Texas Air subsidiary, System One
Holding, Inc., buys one of Eastern's biggest
money makers, its computerized reservation
system. Purchase price is $100 million (an
estimated $100-300 million below value) .
Eastern then is required to pay to use what
it once owned.
FAA warns Eastern not to make its pilots fly
more than the federal limit of thirty hours
in a seven day period. Federal
administrators say that Eastern is currently
not in accordance with FAA limits.
Pilots hire Touche Ross & Co., one of the
country's largest accounting firms, to
analyze Eastern's finances.
The AFL-CIO announces a broad campaign
against TAC's chairman Frank Lorenzo,
declaring that he has shown 'unprecedented











Eastern's unions sue the airline and Texas
Air, claiming the companies campaigned to
denude valuable assets and misled
stockholders as part of a plan to drive
organized labor out of Eastern.
Eastern Airlines is temporarily grounded






charging them with leading an illegal
conspiracy to destroy Eastern Airlines unit.
Eastern pilots propose work-rule concessions
to management while continuing to press for
pay increases.
Eastern's machinists' union gives firm's
latest contract offer to its membership for a
vote. Union leaders refuse to endorse offer.
Donald Trump agrees to buy Eastern Airlines
shuttle service from TAC.
A mediated negotiating session between
Eastern Airlines and its machinists' unions
halts without resolution.
Machinists back call for strike in March.
Eastern offers pilots a new contract that
company claims satisfies demands for job




Strike begins March 4. Machinists are joined
in sympathy by pilots and flight attendants.
Eastern idles 7,000 nonunion workers and
cancels nearly all flights.
Courts refuse to order pilots back to work.
Eastern furloughs another 2,500 employees.
Eastern Airlines files for bankruptcy.
1989 A group led by Peter V- Ueberroth and Eastern
announces the $464 million buyout proposal
has collapsed. Eastern says it intends to
reorganize as a smaller carrier.
May A group led by William Howard, former
chairman of Piedmont Aviation, discloses that
it is interested in making a buyout proposal
for all of Eastern. Chicago businessman
Joseph Ritchie already has expressed
interest.
Eastern graduates its first class of new
pilots hired since the start of the strike.
june David Shapiro, bankruptcy examiner in the
Eastern case, dismisses the Howard group's
offer.
Eastern announces an austerity program for
nonunion employees.








Pilots return to the bargaining table in
order to prevent Lorenzo from gaining
permission to end the pilots' contracts.
Eastern submits a reorganization plan to the
bankruptcy court. Creditors approve.
Striking pilots vote to continue sympathy
walkout.
The striking pilots throw out their leader,
Jack Bavis, for proposing that they consider
ending the walkout.
Lorenzo tells Texas Air shareholders that
Eastern will turn a profit in 1990.
Congress passes a bill to set up a bipartisan
commission to recommend a settlement at
Eastern. President Bush vetoes the bill.
Pilots vote to end the union's sympathy
strike but are unable to return to jobs
because they were taken by replacement
pilots.
Flight attendants agree to end their strike.
American Airlines announces it will buy Latin
American routes from Texas Air for $471
million.
Texas Air proposes a reorganization that
calls for paying creditors only fifty cents
on the dollar.
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APril Texas Air tells creditors it can only repay
them at twenty-five cents on the dollar, with
only five cents of it in cash. The rest
would be in notes from Continental and
Eastern.
Creditors file a formal motion with Judge
Lifland asking for a trustee.
Judge Lifland appoints Martin Shugrue as
trustee, stripping Lorenzo of power at
Eastern.
1991 Eastern Airlines ceases operations.
(Saunders, 1992)
It is extremely obvious that the continuous
labor-management clashes since pre-deregulation played an
important role in its bankruptcy.
Continental Airlines
Continental was founded in 1934 as Varney Speed Lines.
In 1936 Robert Six became the airline's general manager.
(Weinberg, 1984) Working with a small route structure and
only 16 employees, Six moved
the airline to Denver in 1937
and renamed the carrier Continental. "By the mid-1970 's
under Six's leadership, Continental had become a
medium-sized national carrier with revenues of more than
$900 million and a reputation for impeccable service,
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generous compensation and benefits packages for employees
and high morale." (Weinberg 1984)
By the Deregulation Act in 1978, the tide was turning
for Continental. In addition to dealing with new market
competition, Robert Six announced in 1978 that he would like
to retire. He also expressed his feeling that the new CEO
would come from inside the company. This set off a wave of
internal competition that left Continental's management
wavering. To smooth out these organizational problems Six
decided to hire someone from outside the organization. So,
in 1980 he named Alvin L. Feldman CEO of Frontier Airlines
to the job. This caused a "mass
exodus"
of top management
at the same time Continental was beginning to feel the
pressure of deregulation. (Weinberg 1984)
The year 1981 was a crucial year for future of
Continental Airlines. During that year Continental
experienced: the breakup of a desired merger with Western
Airlines, a hostile take over bid by Texas International
Airlines; two strikes and the
apparent suicide of chairman
Alvin L. Feldman. Not only did Continental Airlines feel
the strong effect of
these factors, but they were also
dealing with the effects of
the air traffic controllers
strike.
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During the rest of 1981 Texas Air's Frank Lorenzo
continued his take over attempts of Continental Airlines.
This would not be easy for Frank Lorenzo. Ever since he set
up Nonunion New York Airlines in 1980 he had been the
pilots'
public enemy No. 1. (Staff Reporter October 17,
1983) The union did everything to try to stop Lorenzo.
They even tried to buy Continental. The drama of this
hostile take over occurred on October 12, 1981 when
President Reagan sanctioned the deal allowing TIA to take
control of 50.3% of Continental shares. On October 31, 1982
Continental and Texas International consolidated operations.
This would only be the beginning of the labor battle that
would evolve between Lorenzo and the union labor force.
Lorenzo, after trying to reach labor concessions with
the unions of over 100 million, was unable to get all of the
unions to follow suit. Thus, on August 12, 1983 the
machinist union went on strike. On the first day of the
strike operations were at 85% of capacity. In the interim
Continental began hiring replacement workers. Within almost
a month Continental was flying at full capacity. In
September of that year Lorenzo proposed a new permanent
labor cost reduction plan totaling $150 million annually.
All but the flight dispatchers
union rejected the plan.
(Weinberg 1984)
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On September 24, 1983, Lorenzo's Continental filed for
restructuring under the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Law.
Following the filing Lorenzo's forces began labor
restructuring as part of the corporate restructuring under
the bankruptcy laws. Management cleared the payroll of
8,000 jobs, laying off 65% of the work force. All employees
including top management took at least a 15% pay cut. Two
days after the Chapter 11 filing, Continental resumed
service of 27% of its' flights. Due to the drastic wage
cuts, the average pilots salary of $78,000 was reduced to
$43,000. The pilots and flight attendants went on strike
October 1, 1983. Over night Lorenzo had forced the wage
scale of the new non-labor airlines down his workers
throats. He had reduced labor from 35% to 20% after
bankruptcy. During this corporate rebuilding phase,
Continental's management began to form the airline's niche
as a carrier with twin hubs in Houston and Denver, providing
low cost, high frequency full service flights.
While the unions tried to prove that Lorenzo's only
reason for Chapter 11 filing was to reject union contracts;
the courts dismissed the unions argument and sided with
Lorenzo.
Lorenzo kept up his battle of lowering costs, expanding
routes and increasing the size of the airline; and three
years later Continental Airlines emerged from chapter 11.
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This year and the next would prove to be the catalyst to
ever greater changes in Continental. In February 1986,
Continental's parent announced an agreement to acquire
Eastern Airlines, Inc. Also by the end of 1986 Texas Air
had acquired People Express, Inc. This lead to the
strengthening of Continental's Denver Hub, since with People
Express came most of frontier's asset out of Denver.
By the first of February 1987, Lorenzo merged New York
Air and People Express into Continental, giving Continental
a new hold in the eastern markets. Merging three airlines
was far from simple. With this attempt Continental's
service suffered immensely, causing Continental to attempt




In order to help gain ground Lorenzo teamed up with Jan
Carlzon of SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) to incorporate
SAS's renowned Quality Training Institute. With the losses
that the company incurred in the integration of People
Express, and New York Air the company
was unable to handle
the unexpected rise in costs and decline in traffic that
occurred during the Gulf Crisis. By looking at Figure 7 it
demonstrates that after Continentals large labor problem in
1983, it was able to
exceed the Break Even load factor until
it attempted to integrate Peoples Express and New York Air
in 1987 - 1988. Continental was










11 on December 3, 1990. It was the first year
since 1983,
when Lorenzo fought the unions, that Continental had
an
operating loss. (See Figure 8) This integration
continued



































Findings and Data Analysis
This study focuses on the identification of problematic
issues amongst the group of six airlines that filed for
Chapter 11, or went bankrupt between March 1989 and January
1992.
Several issues have been identified in each airline
leading to their financial woes. These issues have been
grouped into seven categories. These issues were then
charted on a matrix to provide a tool for drawing
conclusions. These common conclusions then were compared to
their performance variables in order to see if any common
relationship occurred. The common issues and their
relationship to one another are described in Table 2 .
Deregulation
The data collected was not intended to justify
whether or not deregulation worked but what effect it had on
the individual carriers. Deregulation left many of the
original trunk carriers with outdated route strategies. For
example, Pan Am and
TWA were dependent on feeder traffic for
their international route systems. At the same time they
were turned down as they attempted mergers to strengthen
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carriers were allowed to serve their own markets. Eastern
also lost it competitive East Coast-Florida dominance as
they did not have enough of a domestic system to support the
loss in this market share.
Deregulation also left management unprepared to deal
with the labor problems that would arise. As non-labor
forces grew, carriers were left with a union work force
costing them an average of 13% more than their new
competitors. Frank Lorenzo, an advocate of deregulation,
summed it up best. "This is an industry which was handed a
total dramatic change by Congress that came along and
deregulated the revenue side but didn't do anything about
the cost side." (Staff Reporter, 1983, Dec. 10)
Reviewing the operational income patterns of many of
the carriers, there is a continuous drop in many cases since
the year 1979. In the Michel-Shaked study on the
probability of air carrier insolvency due deregulation, it
showed that from 1974 to 1982, the probability of insolvency
in Eastern, Continental, Pan Am and TWA had increased. The
study results also closely
predicted the failure of Pan Am.
This study compared many of
the same performance variables
that this study did to




Many common conclusions can be drawn from the
route strategies that were used by these individual
airlines. The first was that many original carriers; TWA,
Pan Am, and Eastern had very narrow-oriented route
structures. Once competition increased they were forced to
compete with a weak route system. In order for these
airlines to prepare themselves for deregulation, they sought
mergers. Many of these mergers were discouraged by CAB
because at the time it looked like they were already
controlling too much of their present markets. These
airlines continued to play
'catch-up' throughout
deregulation .
The newcomers, America West and Midway, started off
with a regional route strategy, but as they grew, their
routes grew too rapidly. Unable to duplicate
Southwest*
s
strategy of controlled growth, both airlines expanded too
quickly. As their debt burden increased, they were
unprepared for the effects of the Gulf Crisis.
Today's stronger carriers, United, Delta, and American,
survive because their vast route systems helped them outlive
the downturn in seasonal and international travel.
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Jet Fleet
Two scenarios are present in this area. One is
the burden of revitalization of an old fleet, and the other
is overzealous purchasing plans.
Pan Am, TWA, and Eastern were forced to spend money on
planes in order to update their fleets and remain
competitive in markets. Unfortunately, many airline leaders
were unable to balance the cost of equipment with labor.
For example, Frank Borman of Eastern purchased over 100
planes in his reign at Eastern, all along telling the unions
that the airline was broke. Pan Am, one of the first to
order the Boeing 757 's, was never able to fund the
modernization needed in the era of strict competition and
went out of business with one of the oldest fleets flying in
the industry. In looking at Table 3, one can see that on
average, the airlines researched in this study,- continued to
have some of the oldest aircraft ten years after
deregulation.
Midway and America West also suffered problems even
though America West had one of the newest fleets in the
industry. America West had increased its flights from 10 in
1983, to over 100 when it filed for
Chapter 11. Midway had
been conservative in its purchases until it ordered over 30
jets costing $900 million prior
to the Gulf War. Their
timing and and speed of















Delta Air Lines 9.5
Source: N. Donohue, & Ghemawat, P- (1989) . The U.S.
airline industry. 1978-1988 (B) . p. 19
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Labor
As these airlines faced competition from new
carriers, they were forced to deal with lowering labor
costs. Unions were forced to use concessions as their only
asset towards achieving what they wanted. This resulted in
long, drawn out labor wars between management and the unions
of TWA, Continental, and Eastern. Frank Lorenzo, the
chairman of Texas Air, played a consistent role in these
labor problems. He was very unpopular for what some believe
was his use of the Chapter 11 laws to avoid union contracts.
He is the only leader ever to file an airline (Continental)
twice for Chapter 11 protection. TWA's union used their
power of concessions to side with takeover specialist, Carl
Icahn, in order to avoid being purchased by Frank Lorenzo.
In comparing the two newcomers, Midway and America
West, to the unionized carriers, there were no signs of
labor/management problems.
Hubs
None of these six airlines had strong,
fortress-type hubs. These are hubs that so strongly served
by one airline, that other carriers serving the same hub are
at a competitive disadvantage. All had high levels of
dominance in their hubs, but many of their hubs were located
in small or very competitive markets. Eastern faced Delta's
strength in Atlanta and Midway face American's in Chicago.
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TWA controlled St. Louis, while America West controlled
Phoenix, but neither had the host markets to give them all
the benefits a powerful hub should have.
Mergers
All the airlines but America West had been
involved in a merger or hostile takeover to strengthen the
airlines. All but Midway who merged with Air Florida,
suffered severe service gaps and poor employee integration.
This is best demonstrated in the Continental and Eastern
cases.
External Environment
With the onset of the recession in the Summer of
1990 and the start of the Persian Gulf Crisis, the problems
these airlines had been battling, greatly intensified. Over
the 18 month period of the Crisis the Airline industry lost
over 6 Billion dollars. With fuel cost almost double and
air traffic slumping, this tended to be a further catalyst
to the insolvency of these airlines.
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Chapter 4
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations Summary
By focusing on the six different carriers as they
began to go bankrupt during the period March 1989 to January
1992, several issues appear to be similar in their fall.
While these factors may not in all cases apply to all six,
there is a definite pattern with several of them. This
pattern can be divided into two cases; one for the airlines
in operation before deregulation and one for the airlines
born out of deregulation.
In the case of the four post deregulation
carriers: Continental, Easter, Pan Am and TWA they had all
attempted to merge with other carriers or they continued to
expand into non-airline business. For example TWA and Pan
Am expanded further into food and hotel companies. Eastern,
Pan Am and Continental tried mergers with Western and
National airlines.
Once they survived the 1980 recession and the
effects of the airtraffic controller strike they were faced
with labor and fleet costs. To fund growing aircraft needs
and compete with the non-union labor; these airlines entered
into tense labor battles and strikes. With situations
weakening they were faced with one or more options:
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liquidating assets or becoming easy prey to hostile
takeovers. in three cases: Eastern, Continental, and TWA
they became prey to takeovers. While Pan Am basically
liquidated its assets over time till they were left with
anything of value.
TWA and Continental did not likely go completely
bankrupt, because their routes and services were not as
limited as; Eastern's Shuttle and Florida routes, and Pan Am
international system.
The remaining upstarts; America West and Midway
had slightly different paths to insolvency. They both began
as regional carriers out of small hubs. As they grew they
both decided that survival meant expansion and larger route
systems. Because their costs were low they both purchased
planes liberally, and expanded beyond their original market
strategies. During their decisions to expand into another
hub they got hurt by the effects of the Gulf Crisis. This
effect lead them into Chapter 11 and bankruptcy.
Conclusions
The largest and most common contributing factor to
the problems in the four original trunk carriers is labor
cost. Their was very little that these carriers could do to
reduce labor costs without causing friction in the company -
It has taken airlines almost the last thirteen years to come
72
up with the two tier pay scale and other measures to make
their labor costs competitive. These carriers were also
plagued with many problems before deregulation, that only
became more intensified after they entered the open market
system.
Corporate growth was the single most common
problem leading to insolvency at Midway and America West.
Each had attempted to become a large domestic carrier too
soon. They had been very successful in their original
regional market strategies. As they began to expansion they
faced strong competition and high debt. Both, with their
last two hub expansions, were forced back off by the effect
of the Gulf Crisis. America West was most able to survive
complete bankruptcy, because it all ready a multi
- hub
system. Midway was not able to survive
-
competing in one
of the most competitive markets and lacking a second hub.
Recommendations
Taking into consideration all the talk of
re-regulating the industry and the charges of unfair
competition in the use of Chapter 11, two recommendations
come out of this study. The first is
that the industry
should be re-regulated during times of uncontrollable
crisis, like the
Persian Gulf war. Next the ethical use of
Chapter 11 should be reviewed in order to
correct miss use.
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Another consideration should be to apply
quantitative research to one of the issues identified. For
example a further study on the effects that labor relations
had on the path to bankruptcy, would provide quantitative
information on this issue.
Since this report was conducted Continental
Airlines has come out of Chapter 11 on April 28, 1993. It
also looks like TWA and America West may not be far behind.
This leads to the further study into how they were able to
use Chapter 11 and become healthy airlines again.
74
REFERENCES
Agins, T. (Pan Am appoints Plaskett to top posts. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 34.
Agins, T. (1988, January 20). Pan Am may select Thomas
G. Plaskett, ex-Continental officer, to succeed Acker. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 35.
Agins, T. (1987, February 10). Icahn's TWA sells more
than tickets. The Wall Street Journal- p. 6.
Air Transport Association of America (1979-92) . Air
Transport 1979-1992. Washington, D.C.: ATA.
Banks, H. (1985, May 6). Now everybody's doing it.
Forbes, pp. 32-33.
Banks, H. (1982) . The rise and fall of Freddie Laker.
London, England: Faber and Faber.
Barns, L. (1984, June 4). A recovered Pan Am faces
tomorrow's hurdles. Business Week, pp. 60-67.
Bender, M. & Altschul, S. (1982) . The chosen
instrument Juan Trippe PAN AM the rise and fall of an
American entrepreneur. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
75
Bernstein, A. (1990) . Grounded Frank Lorenzo and the
destruction of Eastern Airlines. New York, NY: Simon &
Schuster .
Brown, D. A. (1992, February 24). Pension agency
lawsuit threatens Continental reorganization plan. Aviation
Week & Space Technology, p. 38.
Burrough, B. (1985, July 5). Union officials question
Icahn pact on TWA. The Wall Street Journal.
Byrne, H.S. (1985, December 13). Midway Air switches
low-fare strategy, seeks to lure frequent business
fliers.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 8.
Byrne, H. S. (1985, January 21). Midway
Airlines' Bass
quits as top officer; Hinson succeeds him. The
Wall Street
Journal , p. 28.
Carley, W. M. (1986, February
12). Is Pan Am's
strategy the
airline's salvation of its death sentence? The
Wall Street Journal, pp. 1+-
Carley, W. M. & Hertzberg,
D. (1985, November 27). TWA
takeover by Carl Icahn is
said to hit financing, regulatory
snags. The Wall street
Journal.
76
Carley, W. M. (1985, September 24) . TWA appoints
Richard Pearson to be president. The Wall Street Journal,
p. 201.
Carley, W. M. (1985, September 16) . TWA pact
apparently clears the way for investor Icahn to acquire
carrier. The Wall Street Journal, p. 17.
Carley, W. M. (1985, August 16). TWA takeover battle
nearly ended in secret meeting, aide to Icahn says. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 4.
Carley, W. M. (1985, June 20). Carl Icahn's strategies
in his quest for TWA are a model for raiders. The Wall
Street Journal, pp. 1+.
Carley, W. M. (1985, May 7). Pan Am indicates it will
post deficit of $140 million for 1st period, '85 loss. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 7.
Carley, W. M. (1985, January 24). TWA had loss in 4th
quarter, profit for
year. The Wall Street Journal, p. 14.
Carley, W. M. (1984, April 26). Pan Am conducts major
shake-up to
improve its weak performance. The Wall Street
Journal- pp. 31+.
77
Carley, w. M. (1984, January 10). How TWA is trying to
get some workers to take big pay cuts. The Wall Street
Journal, pp. i+.
Carley, W. M. (1983, October 28). Trans World Corp.'s
plan to spin off TWA was prompted by fears on losses. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 7.
Carley, W. M. (1981, August 3). Pan Am turmoil led to
deficits, shake-ups and National merger. The Wall Street
Journal, pp. 1+.
Carley, W. M. (1981, July 8) . Pan Am names Waltrip
chief of airline; Seawell to retire early from the parent.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 3
Carley, W. M. (1981, July 6) For Pan Am, a big change
may be near. The Wall Street Journal, pp.
15+.
Carley, W. M. (1981, March 10) . Airline-service
breakdown persists long after Pan Am, National merge. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 37.
Carley, W. M. (1980, October 20). With CE. Meyer at
controls, TWA rides
this recession out with relative ease.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 29.
Carley, w. M. (1980, January 10). Apparent departure
of
'Bud'
Maytag marks end of an era. The Wall Street
Journal, p. 31.
Carley, W. M. & Frazier, S. (1979, September 18). Who
says little TIA can't buy big TWA? Many believe it will.
The Wall Street Journal. CXCIV(55) , P- 1+-
Carley, W. M. (1978, March 1). Pan Am seeking seven
key U.S. routes in bid to become major domestic carrier.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 4.
Carley, W. M. (1978, February 1) . TWA plans surgery on
fleet, changes in accounting to cut its domestic losses.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 2.
Chakravarty, S. N. (1981, June 22) . Power dive.
Forbes, pp. 64-67.
Cifelli, A. (1983, October 31). Management by
bankruptcy- Fortune , pp. 69-72.
Cohen, L. P- (1986) TWA, others offer transcontinental
one-way $99 fare.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 42.
79
Cohn, G. (1988, April 11). Frank Borman on
deregulation, unions, managing and Borman. The Wall Street
Journal, p. 33.
Cohn, G. & Lowenstein, R. (1986, January 24) . Eastern
Airlines is in yet another crisis that it should survive.
The Wall Street Journal, pp. l+.
Cohn, G. (1986, January 9) . Eastern Air union leaders
are taking steps toward possible bid for control. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 5.
Cohn, G. (1985, September 10) . Eastern Airlines
rebounds from the brink. The Wall Street Journal, p. 6.
Cohn, G. (1985, May 23). Eastern
Airlines'
Leonard is
viewed as heir apparent to succeed Borman. The Wall Street
Journal, p. 40.
Cohn, G. (1984, October 31). Labor's big new role
inside Eastern Airlines seems to be succeeding. The Wall
Street Journal, pp. 1+-




Doganis, R. (1985) . Flying off course: The economics
of international airlines. London, England: George Allen &
Unwin Publishing.
Donohue, N. , & Ghemawat, P. (1989) . The U.S. airline
industry. 1978-1988 (B) , 1-25.
Dornheim, M. A. (1992, March 2). America West recovery
plans focus on new hub at Columbus. Aviation Week & Space
Technology, pp. 34-35.
Dubin, R. A. (1985, August 19). The TWA deal: will
labor deliver for Icahn? The Wall Street Journal, p. 36.
Dubin, R. A. (1985, May 27) . Raiders in the sky: will
the airline industry be next? Business Week, pp. 74+-
Eastern, Annual Report, 1977.
Eastern, Annual Report, 1978.
Eastern, Annual Report, 1983.
Eastern, Annual Report, 1984.
Ehrlich, E. (1984, November
26). Without TWA, Trans
World has wings. Business Week,
p. 162.
Ellis, J. E. (1990, October 1). Can these upstart
airlines handle the heavy weather? Business Week, pp.
122-123.
Engardio, P. & Power, C. (1989, March 27). The wings
of man weren't broken overnight. Business Week, p. 31.
Gaines, L. (1991, July 8). America West in Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Travel Weekly, 5_0(57) , pp. 1+-
Gross, L. (1981, March 16). "If we can
just..."
Forbes . pp. 155-158.
Harris, Jr., R. J. (1981, August 11).
Continental Air
Chairman found dead in his office, apparently a suicide.
The Wall Street Journal, p. 6.




to control Continental Air may face
struggle in banks and
courts. The Wall Street Journal, p.
24.
Hawkins, C. , Miles, G.
L. , Marcial, G. , Hurlock, J.,
&
Schiller, Z. (1986, October
27). Carl Icahn: raider or
manager? Business Week, pp. 98-104.
82
Hertzberg, D. (1986, June 6). TWA names Carl Icahn as
chairman but his victory is seen as bittersweet. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 3.
Hertzberg, D. (1985, August 26). Icahn increases stake
to 50.3% in Trans World. The Wall Street Journal, p. 2.
Hertzberg, D. (1985, August 21) . TWA rejects steps
aimed at helping Texas Air defeat Icahn 's takeover bid. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 3.
Jennings, K. (1992, Spring). Eastern's final days:
labor relations lessons for managers in other organization.
Transportation Journal, pp. 27-38.
Kasper, D. M. (1988) . Liberalizing international trade
in air services deregulation and globalization. Cambridge,
MA: Bal linger Publishing Company.
Kilman, S. (1986, May 5). Pritzers are said unwilling
to fight for Eastern Air. The Wall Street Journal, p. 12
Kilman, S. (1987, July 20). An
unexpected result of
airline decontrol is return to monopolies. The Wall Street
Journal, p.l.
83
Kim, M. (1992) . Airline mergers. In, Corporate
takeovers and productivity (pp. 115-126) . Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
Kolcum, E. H. (1991, January 28) . Airline mainstay
Eastern stops flying after 62 years. Aviation Week & Space
Technology, pp. 64-65.
Koten, J. & Lehrer, L. (1986, February 28) . TWA agrees
to buy Ozark for $250 million. The Wall Street Journal, p.
2.
Koten, J. (1985, September 9). Midway's Hinson, in
just six months, seems to have turned airline around. The
Wall Street Journal, p. 30.
Kraar, L. (1981, December 28) . Putting Pan Am back
together again. Fortune, pp. 4 2-47.
Krauss, C. (1985, September 25) . Eastern Airlines
names Leonard as its President. The Wall Street Journal, p.
39.
Kuttner, R. (1985, November 1). Sharing power at
Eastern Air Lines. Harvard Business Review, pp. 91-101.
Leinster, C. (1988, February 29) . Icahn on Icahn.
Fortune, pp. 54-56.
84
Leinster, c. (1985, April 15). Can Pan Am survive?
Fortune
, pp. 49-50.
Loeb, M. & Nazario, S. L. (1983, September 28).
Eastern Air told union to fight and Chapter 11. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 4.
Loeffelholz, S. (1989, September 5). Staying power:
while takeover artists eye the big airlines, Midway and
America West are just happy to be alive. Financial World,
pp. 34-37.
Labich, K. (1988, April 11). The showdown at Eastern
Air Lines. Fortune . pp. 65-67.
Mandell, R. W. (1979) . Financing the capital
requirements of the U.S. airline industry in the 1980s.
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company.
McGough, R. (1989. June 27). Death of an airline?
Financial World, pp. 66-69.
McKenna, J. T. (1992, January 13). Bankruptcy laws
misused in attempts to stop grounding of Eastern, Pan Am.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, p. 47.
85
Michel, A. & Shaked, I. (1987, February). Airline
deregulation and the probability of air carrier insolvency.
The Financial Review, 22(1), pp. 159-173.
Montgomery, J. (1978, April 12). Eastern Airlines
fires new salvos in attempt to slow Delta's gains. The Wall
Street Journal, pp. 1+.
Midway, Annual Report, 1980.
Midway, Annual Report, 1981.
Midway, Annual Report, 1982.
Midway, Annual Report, 1983.
Midway, Annual Report, 1984.
Midway, Annual Report, 1985.
Nelson, P. B. (1981) . Corporations in crisis:
behavioral observations for bankruptcy policy. New York,
NY: Praeger Publisher.
O'Connor, W. E. (1985). An introduction to airline
economics. 3rd Ed. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.
O'Hanlon, T. (1974, October). The mess that made
beggars of Pan Am and T.W.A. Fortune, pp. 122-127+-
86
Ott, J. (1991, July 8). America West declares
bankruptcy, begins route restructuring. Aviation Week &
Space Technology, p. 30.
Pan Am, Annual Report, 1983.
Pan Am, Annual Report, 1984.
Pan Am, Annual Report, 1985.
Pan Am, Annual Report, 198 6.
Pan Am, Annual Report, 1987.
Pan Am, Annual Report, 1988.
Piatt, H. D. (1985) . Why companies fail. Lexington,
MA: D.C. Heath and Company -
Poling, B. (1991, July 15) . Bankrupt lines account for
20% of U.S. traffic. Travel Weekly. 50(56), pp. 1+-
Popper, A. (1987, October 19). Will it be Kerkorian to
the rescue at Pan Am? Business Week, pp. 57-58.
Popper, A. (1983, November 7).
Continental's feisty
Chairman defends deregulation and himself. Business Week,
pp. 111-115.
Rakowski, J. P. & Bejou, D. (1992,
Fall). Birth,
marriage, life, and death: a life-cycle approach for
examining the deregulated U.S. airline industry.
Transportation Journal. 32(1), pp. 15-29.
Saddler, J. & Roberts, J. L. (1986, June 3). Borman to
quit as Eastern Air's Chairman, Chief. The Wall Street
Journal, p. 2.
Sampson, A. (1984) . Empires of the sky the politics.
contests, and cartels of world airlines. New York, NY:
Random House.
Saunders, M. D. (1992) . Eastern's armageddon: labor
conflict and the destruction of Eastern Airlines. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press.
Schine, E. & Dwyer, P. (1992, August 3). America West:
the final crisis? Business Week, p. 28.
Seneker, H. (1985, May 6). Daylight ahead? Forbes,
pp. 33-34.
Serling, R. J. (1980) . From the captain to the
colonel an informal history of Eastern Airlines. New York,
NY: Dial Press.
Sherman, S. P. (1983, October 17). Eastern Air Lines on
the brink. Fortune, pp. 102-112.
88
Siconolfi, M. (1986, June 12). TWA president resigns
post after 8 months. The Wall Street Journal, p. 5.
Smith, Geoffrey, (1983, July 4). Tail wind at Pan Am.
Forbes
, pp. 42-45.
Staff Reporter (1991, December 30). Pan Am 1927-1991.
Travel Weekly. 51(1) , pp. 1+-
Staff Reporter (1987, June 10). Five airlines move to
meet price rises by 2 other carriers. The Wall Street
Journal, p. 8.
Staff Reporter (1986, May 20). TWA's attendants end
10-week strike without labor pact. The Wall Street Journal.
p. 18.
Staff Reporter (1985, October 24). TWA appoints
Ehrlich executive Vice President. The Wall Street Journal,
p. 16.
Staff Reporter (1985, April 3). Eastern Air reaches
three-year accord with its machinists. The Wall Street
Journal, p. 36.
89
Staff Reporter (1984, December 31). Eastern Airlines
plans to extend cost cuts set to expire tonight. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 6.
Staff Reporter (1984, March 19). The trying times for
Continental aren't over yet. Business Week, pp. 44-46.
Staff Reporter (1984, January 30). Continental is
coming out a winner. Business Week, p. 21.
Staff Reporter (1983, October 17). Lorenzo battles to
keep his airline aloft. Business Week, p. 42.
Staff Reporter (1983, July 25). TWA: the incredible
shrinking airline. Business Week, pp. 86-87.
Staff Reporter (1983, April 11). Why Eastern is on a
short string'. Business Week, pp. 116-118.
Staff Reporter (1981, October 26) . How Texas Air won
its fight. Business Week, pp. 182-185.
Staff Reporter (1981, June 22) . What the National
merger did to Pan Am. Business Week, pp. 86-88.
Staff Reporter (1981, June 15). Upstarts in the sky.
Business Week, pp. 78-92.
90
Staff Reporter (1981, February 10) . Continental Air
sought by Texas International Air. The Wall Street Journal.
p. 2.
Staff Reporter (1980, December 22). Continental
Airlines flight attendants end two-week strike. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 7.
Staff Reporter (1980, May 19). Trans World Corp.: the
strategy squeeze on the airline. Business Week, pp.
104-107+-
Staff Reporter (1979, November 19). TWA layoff in
January set for 100 more pilots. The Wall Street Journal.
p. 20.
Staff Reporter (1979, November 12). New prosperity for
old airports. Business Week, pp. 68-74.
Staff Reporter (1978, September 8). Pan Am reaches
definitive accord to buy National. The Wall Street Journal.
p. 6.
Staff Reporter (1978, September 6). TWA is denied
coach fare bid, receives others. The Wall Street Journal.
p. 2.
91
Staff Reporter (1978, August 25). Pan Am CAB permission
to acquire National Air, buy 25% pending decision. The Wall
Street Journal
, p. 2.
Staff Reporter (1978, August 17). Trans World Air says
it plans holding firm. The Wall Street Journal, p. 33.
Staff Reporter (1978, June 18). Trans World Air says
its 4th period results were best since 1966. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 14.
Staff Reporter (1978, April 28). TWA's air operation
expects healthy gain in net income for 1978. The Wall
Street Journal, p. 15.
Staff Reporter (1978, March 6). Pan Am domestic filing
focuses on Houston hub. Aviation Week & Space Technology.
p. 30.
Staff Reporter (1977, November 7) . TWA to inaugurate
service to London from Newark. Aviation Week & Space
Technology, p. 30.
Staff Reporter (1977, September 5). Pan Am: in the
black for now. Business Week,
p. 52-57-
92
Staff Reporter (1977, July 18). TWA discount approval
spurs quick response by competitors. Aviation Week & Space
Technology, p. 27.
Staff Reporter (1976, August 9). Can TWA afford its
high cost of flying? Business Wesk
, pp. 60-61.
Stevens, M. (1993). King Icahn: the biography of a
renegade capital i at. USA: Dutton Book.
Taneja, N. K. (1982) . Airline planning: corporate.
financial and marketing. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and
Company .
Taneja, N. K. (1988) . The international airline
industry trends, issues and challenges. Lexington, MA:
D.C. Heath and Company.
Taylor & Sygma (1985, April 29) . Why Frank Borman
finally has something to smile about. Business Week, pp.
54-55.
Thatcher, C. (1987, September 21). These two airlines
are doing it their way. Business Week, pp. 58-62.
Troxell, Jr., T. N. (1983, August 29). Midway's
gamble. Barron's, p. 53.
93
Tully, S. (1982, November 29). Pan Am's $200-million
tranquilizer. Fortune
, pp. no-112.
TWA, Annual Report, 1982.
TWA, Annual Report, 1983.
TWA, Annual Report, 1986.
TWA, Annual Report, 1987.
TWA, Annual Report, 1990.
Valente, J. (1988, October 18). Pan Am and TWA,
battered by rivals, struggle to survive. The Wall Street
Journal , p. 1.
Velocci, Jr., A. L. (1992, January 20). Icahn
struggles to keep TWA flying in hard times. Aviation Week &
Space Technology, pp. 42-44.
Wada, I. (1991, December 23).
TWA and Continental
discuss merger. Travel Weekly, 50(102), p. 3.
Wada, I. (1991, December
12). Pan Am ceases
operations. Travel Weekly. 50(99), p.l.
Wada, I. (1991, November
7). America West's head moves
to quell takeover, merger rumors.
Travel Weekly -
94
Wada, I. (1991, July 18). Pan Am ok's Delta's offer to
buy assets. Travel Weekly, 50(57) , pp. i+.
Weinberg, M. W. (1984, January 1). Continental
Airlines (A) . Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.
Weiner, S. B. (1987, March 9). A profitable survivor.
Forbes, p. 106.
Williams, J. D. (1985, May 1). Carl Icahn is said to
be active buyer of TWA common. The Wall Street Journal, p.
2.
Williams, J. D. (1983, September 29). TWA, in red, may
be spun off to shareholders. The Wall Street Journal, p. 2.
Williams, J. D. (1983, August 22). TWA, Republic,
other carriers try to cut labor costs in attempt to return
to profit. The Wall Street Journal, p. 5.
Wolff, B. R. (1983, October 10). Airlines in turmoil.
Business Week, pp. 98-102.
95
